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INTRODUCTION

As of 2015, 41.6 million students had received federal aid in the United States,
together sustaining a total of $1.212 trillion dollars in student loan debt.' This is
more than double the cumulative amount of outstanding federal student aid in
2007, which was $516 billion.2 There are many problems in our country's student
loan system that have resulted in these remarkable numbers, including skyrocketing
costs of tuition, the ease with which lenders supply tens of thousands of dollars to
students, and the effectiveness of repayment programs.' Separate from the process
by which a student applies for aid, attends school, graduates, and pays back the
debt, one looming problem concerns the issues presented when a student loan
debtor files for bankruptcy.'
When a debtor files for bankruptcy, the goal is to give the debtor a "fresh start"
and discharge the entirety of his debts.s However, there are exceptions to this
general principle.' For example, discharge is not permitted for loans obtained by
fraud,' for luxury goods aggregating more than $650 owed to a single creditor of
which was incurred on or within 90 days before filing,' or for restitution payments
owed.' For the purposes of this Note, the exception prohibiting the discharge of
student loans is the most important.'o
Until 1976, the bankruptcy laws did not address student loans or treat student

' FederalStudent Loan Portfobo, FED. STUDENT AID: AN OFF. OF THE U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/fsawg/datacenter/library/PortfolioSummaryxls
(last
visited Sept. 21, 2016).
2

Id.

3See Kevin J. Smith, Defining the Brunner Test's Three Parts: Time to Set a NationalStandardfor

All Three Partsto Determine When to Allow the DischargeofFederalStudent Loans, 58 S.D. L. REV.
250, 251-55 (2013) (discussing various problems with the U.S. loan repayment system).
4See

id.

s Id. at 267. This result is accomplished most often through a Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing for which
the debtor's assets are liquidated and distributed to creditors, providing "rapid relief" for the debtor,
versus a Chapter 13 bankruptcy filing for which debtors retain their property but agree to a plan to repay
the debt for three to five years, after which the remaining debt will be discharged. Sarah Edstrom
Smith, Should the Eighth Circuit Continue to be the Loan Ranger? A Look at the Totalty of the
Circumstances Test for Discharging Student Loans Under the Undue Hardship Erception in
Bankruptcy, 29 HAMLINE L. REv. 601, 609-10 (2006). See also Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S.
234, 244 (1934) ("[I]t gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor ... a new opportunity in life and a
dear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt.").
6 SeeI1 U.S.C. § 523 (2016).
1Id. § 523(a)(2)(A).
I Id. § 523(a)(2)(C)(i)(I).
9 Id. § 523(a)(13).
1o Id. § 523(a)(8).
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loans differently than other types of debts.' As student loans became more of the
norm as a means of paying for education, and as concerns rose over possible abuse,
student loans became non-dischargeable through many amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code (the Code). 2 Now, as a general principle, student loans are nondischargeable in bankruptcy unless the debtor can show that the loans impose an
undue hardship upon him or his dependents." The fear was that students would
incur massive amounts of student loan debt and immediately after graduation
would file for bankruptcy, essentially defrauding the system, which would
inevitably lead to a breakdown of the bankruptcy and student loan systems.1
There are great arguments for and against allowing a discharge of student loans,
but the undue hardship test, the standard used to determine whether a student loan
should be discharged, remains problematic for courts. The student loan discharge
process has been highly inconsistent among courts because the Code does not
define "undue hardship," which has forced courts to hash it out themselves.'s
"Establishing a consistent . . . standard for courts is difficult because the legal issues
presented are often fact-driven,"' 6 but this should not be an excuse for the lack of
guidance provided.
The most important factor in determining whether a student loan should be
discharged revolves around whether the circumstances that led to the debtor's

n Sarah Edstrom Smith, supra note 6, at 611. The first Bankruptcy Act of 1898 did not address
student loans. Id. at 611. Later, Congress adopted the Education Amendments of 1976, making federal
student loans non-dischargeable unless the repayment period began at least five years prior to filing. Id.
at 612. In 1990, the five-year timeline was extended to seven, and the exception provision was made to
include Chapter 13 bankruptcies. Id. at 612-13. In 1998, the time exception was eliminated, leaving
only an undue hardship exception to non-dischargeability. Id. at 612. In 2005, the Code was expanded
to include not only government loans, but also "loans issued by profit and nongovernmental
organizations." Id. at 613.
2
Id. at 611-12. "After all, the government is the backer on those loans ... and federal loans have a
lot of options for repayment such as Income Based Repayment and loan forgiveness programs that give
borrowers more realistic options for repayment and a way out." Kayla Webley, Why Can't You
2012),
(Feb.
9,
TIME
Loans
in
Bankruptcy?,
Student
Discharge
http://business.time.com/2012/02/09/why-cant-you-discharge-student-loans-in-bankruptcy/.
' § 523(a)(8). See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Jesperson, 571 F.3d 775, 782 (8th Cir. 2009)
("Congress carved an exception to the 'fresh start' permitted by discharge for unpaid, federally subsidized
student loans. If the debtor . . . can make student loan repayments while still maintaining a minimal
standard of living, the absence of a fresh start is not an undue hardship.").
14
Id.; see also Lohman v. Conn. Student Loan Found. (In re Lohman), 79 Bankr. D. Vt. 576, 58081 (1987) (stating that increased incidence of debtors discharging loans without any repayment posed a
"threat to the continuance of the educational loan programs").
i See § 101 (providing no definition for "undue hardship"); see also Jason luliano, An Empirical
Assessment ofStudent Loan Dischargesand the Undue HardshipStandard, 86 AM. BANKR. L. J. 495,

496 (2012).
16 Chandler Harris, The Dischargeabilityof Student Loan Debt in the Sixth Circuit, TENN. B.
ASS'N (Mar. 1, 2013, 1:00 A.M.), http://www.tba.org/journal/the-dischargeability-of-student-loandebt-in-the-sixth-circuit.
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inability to pay were within the debtor's control.17 As will be discussed in more
detail below, the second prong of the BrunnerTest, (the test most widely used to
establish undue hardship)" which corresponds to circumstances beyond the
debtor's control, requires a demonstration "that additional circumstances exist
indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist . . . ." Although this prong
regards a timing issue (how long the circumstance is likely to persist), it also is
extremely important that the circumstance be "beyond the debtor's control.'"o This
Note may use the term "control" or "self-imposed" interchangeably to discuss this
concept.
Because part of the purpose of the exception to student loans was to prevent
debtors from taking advantage of the bankruptcy system, it is important that courts
are cognizant of self-imposed hardships. As one may imagine, self-imposed
hardships should be particularly unworthy of discharge under bankruptcy. A
hypothetical depiction of this phenomenon would be when a debtor incurs
$200,000 in student loans, majors in chemical engineering, and takes a job after
graduation as a career bartender. 2 1 Courts are, and should be, particularly wary of
debtors attempting to discharge loans in circumstances such as these.
Part I of this Note will depict the undue hardship test, with particular attention
to the second prong, the circumstances surrounding the debtor's inability to pay,
and will explain why this is the most important part of the analysis. Part II of this
Note will analyze the obvious uncontrollable hardships, which courts should not
hesitate to discharge. Within this category would be the student loan debtor who,
for example, has a serious medical illness, like multiple sclerosis, which renders him
disabled and unable to work for the foreseeable future. One can see that this
hardship is uncontrollable and not self-imposed in any way. As long as the debtor
does not have the requisite disposable income required to make minimum
payments, courts should discharge student loans in this kind of situation. Part III
of this Note will analyze hardships that are clearly not deserving of a student loan
discharge because of the control that the debtor has on their circumstances. Part IV
of this Note will present recommendations for accounting for the presence of selfimposed hardships in bankruptcy proceedings and will explain why these hardships
are so harmful to the integrity of the exception and to the bankruptcy and student
loan system. These recommendations include (1) providing a definition of "undue
hardship".in the Code for purposes of 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8), which would declare
17 Frushour v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Frushour), 433 F.3d 393, 401 (4th Cit. 2005);
Barrett v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Barrett) , 487 F.3d 353, 358-59 (6th Cir. 2007).
'sluliano, supra note 15, at 496.
I' Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cit. 1987).
2 Barrett, 487 F.3d at 359.
21 With regard to attending college and choosing a major, many contend that society and colleges
themselves are at fault for encouraging students to enroll in degree programs that are useless and/or
unsuited for them. See Jillian Gordon, Why Im TelUng Some ofMy Students Not to Go to College,
PBS NEWSHOUR (Apr. 15, 2105, 1:23 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/im-teuingstudents-go-college/. This is an important factor to consider, and it is certainly a problem directly
affecting student loan debtors. But the Bankruptcy Code is not the place to resolve this issue.
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that self-imposed hardships do not qualify as undue hardships, or (2) adopting a
modified and more streamlined common law test which would make the second
prong dispositive and declare that self-imposed hardships do not satisfy the prong.
I. THE BRUNNERTEST FOR UNDUE HARDSHIP

Two primary tests have emerged to assess and define "undue hardship." The
first is the BrunnerTest.22 The second is the "totality of the circumstances test,"a
which is used in only two circuitS 24 and will not be discussed heavily in this Note.
The three prongs of the BrunnerTest are:
(1) [T]hat the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income
and expenses, a 'minimal' standard of living for herself and her
dependents if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional
circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to
persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the
student loans; and (3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts
25
to repay the loans.

Debtors have the burden of proving all three prongs of the BrunnerTest.'
A. ProngOne: Minimal StandardofLiving
The first prong requires "that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current
income and expenses, a 'minimal' standard of living for herself and her dependents
if forced to repay the loans . . .. "27 The first prong is essentially an income and
expense analysis, which will determine whether the debtor's budget has room for
the student loan payments. 28 Once a "budget" is completed, the court analyzes the
debtor's budget to determine whether the debtor can maintain a minimal standard
of living while also paying on the student loans.2 9 Debtors must show that the their
finances are more than merely "tight,' 0o but they are not required to,'show they are

2 This test originated in the Second Circuit in Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp.,
831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) and is used in nine circuits. Juliano, supra note 15, at 496-97.
2 This test emerged in the Eighth Circuit in Andrews v. S.D. Student Loan Assistance Corp. (In

re Andrews), 661 F.2d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 1981). Sarah Edstrom Smith, supra note 6, at 619.
24 The Eighth Circuit has adopted the totality of the circumstances test, while the First Circuit
tends to allow courts to use either approach. Juliano, supra note 15, at 497.

226 Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.
Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In reFaish), 72 F.3d 298, 306 (3d Cir. 1995).
27
Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.

28 Kevin J. Smith, supra note

3, at 258.

Id. at 257-59.
3 In re Faish, 72 F.3d at 306.
29
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living below the poverty line,31 nor do they need to prove "utter hopelessness."3 2
Some courts use the income of the debtor at the time of bankruptcy, and some
courts look at the past income of the debtor." Over time, courts have established
elements to define "minimal standard of living." Six essential considerations have
been identified as: (1) housing, (2) electricity, gas, water, (3) groceries and certain
cleaning products, (4) vehicles for transportation to work and other daily activities,
such as medical appointments, (5) health and dental insurance, and (6) minimal
recreation.34
It is extremely important to consider the amount of disposable income the
debtor has. Currently, even if the debtor satisfies prong one, the circumstances still
must be uncontrollable under prong two in order to maintain the integrity of the
exception to discharge. A more prudent approach would be to evaluate the
circumstances surrounding the debtor's inability to pay before considering whether
the debtor can maintain a minimal standard of living while repaying the debt. This
should be done to reflect the importance of control over the hardship in
determining whether discharge is appropriate. 3 5
B. ProngTwo: CircmnstancesLikely to Persist

The second and most important" prong of the Brunner Test requires that
"additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist
for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans . . . ." In

other words, "a total incapacity [must be proven] in the future to pay debts for
reasons not within [the debtor's] control."3 s There are essentially two aspects of this
prong. First, a circumstance must exist which causes the debtor to be unable to
make payments." Second, this circumstance must be likely to exist for some time
to come; in other words, the court must speculate about the future. 0 Both aspects

31

Goodman v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re Goodman), 449 B.R. 287, 293 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio

2011).
32 United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Nascimento (In re Nascimento), 241 B.R. 440, 445 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 1999).
3 Kevin J. Smith, supra note 3, at 258.
Douglas v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Douglas), 366 B.R. 241, 253 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.
2007).
3s Courts are already treating the second prong as dispositive but this is not properly reflected in the
Code or in the Brunner Test. See, eg., Brightful v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re
Brightful), 267 F.3d 324, 331 (3d Cir. 2001).
3 Courts have, for some time, regarded the second prong as the most important; without explicitly
doing so, courts regard it as dispositive. See In re Brightli,267 F.3d at 328, 331 (refusing to discuss the
first and third prong in detail because the court regarded the second as decisive and most important).
" Brunner v. N.Y. Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987).
3 In re Brghtful, 267 F.3d at 328 (quoting Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Faish (In re
Faish), 72 F.3d 298, 307 (3d Cir. 1995)).
* Goulet v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 284 F.3d 773, 778 (7th Cir. 2002).
Id. Speculation has been looked down upon, but this is precisely what the second prong requires:
speculation about the future earnings and circumstantial disposition of the debtor. See id.
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are essential-even if a circumstance existed which imposed an undue hardship, the
courts would not grant a discharge if the circumstance would resolve itself in one
month. The circumstances need to be unique and/or extraordinary,41 and "may
include, but are not limited to, illness, disability, a lack of useable job skills, or the
existence of a large number of dependents . .. . [T]he most important factor in
satisfying the second prong is that the 'additional circumstances' must be beyond
the debtor's control, not borne of free choice."42 This is not a new notion. Control
has been regarded as extremely important by courts for some time-yet this has not
been properly reflected in the Code.
There are endless circumstances that could qualify under the second prong of
the Brunner Test, although the leading cause is physical illness.43 Not only are
physical illnesses and disabilities the most common forms of circumstances that
meet the undue hardship test, they also serve as most vividly deserving of a
discharge because they "can be easily shown to a court without much speculation.""
Additionally, courts have ruled that expert medical testimony is not required in
order to meet the debtor's burden of proving the circumstance,45 making this prong
that much easier to satisfy with a physical illness. Mental and emotional illnesses
are included within this category,' albeit they are more difficult to diagnose, prove,
and project into the future. For example, the In re Nichols court discharged the
student loan debt for a person who had a history of psychiatric disorders even
though the debtor was deemed "well educated and articulate." 47 Similarly, the court
in In re Nixon partially discharged the student loan debt of a debtor with Bipolar I
Disorder, even though both the debtor and her doctors agreed that the disorder did
not prevent her from working.48
Another popular and controversial circumstance is earning power and
unemployment. In this regard, courts have the heightened duty of making
predictions that they cannot make with accuracy. 9 This challenge could be
curtailed by paying particular attention to the control that the debtor has over their
situation. After all, "[t]he government is not twisting the arms of potential

41 In le Brightfd, 267 F.3d at 328-29 (citing Ballard v. Virginia ex rel. State Educ. Assistance
Auth. (Inre Ballard), 60 B.R. 673, 675 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1986).
42 Barrett v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Barrett), 487 F.3d 353, 359 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal
citations and quotations omitted) (quoting Oyler v. Edue. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Oyler), 397 F.3d
382, 386 (6th Cir. 2005)).
4Kevin J. Smith, supra note 3, at 262. Additionally, an empirical study concluded that debtors
who were successful in discharging their student loans were more likely to have medical problems.
luliano, supra note 15, at 498.
44 Kevin J. Smith, supra note 3, at 262.
4' In re Barrett, 487 F.3d at 360.
4 Kevin J. Smith, supra note 3, at 263.
47 Nichols v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. (Inre Nichols), 15 B.R. 208, 209 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981).
48 Nixon v. Key Educ. Res. (In re Nixon), 453 B.R. 311, 319 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2011).
9 Kevin J. Smith, supra note 3, at 264.
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students." Specifically, take the situation where a debtor chooses to work in a lowincome career, like the debtor did in Inre Oyler.s" The court concluded, "[c]hosing
a low-paying job cannot merit undue hardship relief."52 The court in Oyler
emphasized the power that the debtor had over his choice to work as a pastor of a
small start-up church in conjunction with his failure to make efforts to supplement
his income.s" Positions in noble careers do not automatically warrant a discharge,
although they can qualify a debtor for certain repayment plans such as the Public
Service Loan Forgiveness Program.54 Likewise, a debtor who is lackadaisical in his
efforts to obtain and maintain a job for which he is qualified will not satisfy the
second prong of the BrunnerTest,ss and even under a totality of the circumstances
analysis courts have referenced the debtor's self-imposed limitations in this sort of
situation.56

As should be immediately noted, the second prong of the Brunner Test does
not explicitly mention the control that the debtor has over his circumstance.57
Neither does the Code.5 This fact is interesting because of how often courts have
emphasized the importance of control.5 It makes sense for the Code or applicable
circuit test to reflect the importance of the nature of the circumstance. The
presence of overwhelming regard to the control that the debtor has over the
hardship is the first sign that this concern should be reflected more prominently in
some manner. Additionally, a restructuring of the Code and/or the common law
rule to include particular regard to the cause of the circumstance will streamline the
process for courts and save all parties time and money. After all, courts often treat
the second prong as dispositive regardless of the fact that this is not how the
procedure is currently outined.60

so In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1137 (7th Cir. 1993) (referring to the fact that students are not
being forced into postsecondary education and student loan obligations).
s1 Oyler v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In reOyler), 397 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2005).
52

54

Id

PubicService Loan Forgiveness, FED. STUDENT AID: AN OFF. OF THE U.S. DEP'T OF EDUc.,
httpsf//studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/public-service (last visited Sept. 23,
2016).
s Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Jesperson, 571 F.3d 775, 782 (8th Cir. 2009).
6
Id. at 781, 782.
1 See Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987).
ss See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2016).
s1 Control is emphasized in the following cases, among many others: Jesperson, 571 F.3d at 783 (J.
Smith, concurring); Barrett v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Barrett), 487 F.3d 353, 359 (6th Cir.
2007); In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1136 (7th Cir. 1993); Connor v. Ill. State Scholarship Comm'n
(In re Conner), 89 B.R. 744, 749 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that opting to send children to
private school is a self-imposed hardship); Fischer v. State Univ. of N.Y. (In re Fischer), 23 B.R. 432,
434 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) (without explicitly saying control); Perkins v. Vt. Student Assistance Corp.
(Inre Perkins), 11 B.R. 160, 161 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1980) (holding that buying a new car is a self-imposed
hardship that did not warrant discharge).
' See Brightful v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Brightfid), 267 F.3d 324, 330-31 (3d
Cir. 2001).
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C. ProngThree: Good Faith Effort to Repay
The third prong of the BrunnerTest requires "that the debtor has made good
faith efforts to repay the loans." 6 ' Part of this test considers how much time has
elapsed between the time that the loans became due and the time that the debtor
filed for bankruptcy.62 This is logical because the purpose of the exception to
student loans in § 523(a)(8) is to prevent the debtor from incurring student loan
debt and shortly thereafter filing for bankruptcy and discharging that debt.6
Therefore, some amount of time is required to pass before a student loan can be
considered for discharge, in addition to the requirement in the second prong that
the undue hardship be expected to last indefinitely. The more time that passes, and
the more payments a debtor makes or attempts to make, the stronger the debtor's
request for discharge will be. 64 An example for which a lack of good faith to repay is
clear appears in Brunner itself. In Brunner, the debtor requested a student loan
discharge a mere ten months after graduating, within a month of the date of the
first required payment, without having made a payment, and without first
6
requesting a deferment. s

The third prong may not be as important as the BrunnerTest makes it seem.
Even if a debtor makes no payments whatsoever, they can still pass the third prong
and be eligible for a discharge. 66 A Sixth Circuit case in 2007 permitted the
discharge of student loans for a debtor who had done this very thing.6 7 That court
took this course of action because of the severe and uncontrollable medical illnesses
that the debtor had-the highest level of Hodgkin's disease and avascular necrosis,
which caused him constant and severe pain, disallowing him to do much more than
move a computer mouse with his hand.68 Granted, time had passed between the
debtor's payments becoming due and his filing for bankruptcy, but the time was
only two years.' 9 As is demonstrated by this case, it is again clear that the courts are
more concerned with prong two, the circumstances which cause a debtor's inability
to repay. There have been many proposals requiring a certain amount of years to
pass during this time,70 but the scope of this Note is to shed light on the fact that
the second prong is by far the most important and this fact should be reflected
more appropriately. Only after a debtor proves that they lack control over the

Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.
2 Kevin J. Smith, supra note 3, at 266.
63 Harris, supra note 16.
6 Kevin J. Smith, supra note 3, at 266.
6s Brunner, 831 F.2d at 397.
667 See Barrett v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In reBarrett), 487 F.3d 353, 365-66 (6th Cir. 2007).
JId
61 Id. at 357.
69 Id. at 356-57 (debtor filed for bankruptcy December 28, 2001, after he incurred the debt while
obtaining his degree in 1999).
70 One proposal was for ten years. Kevin J. Smith, supra note 3, at 271.
61
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hardship should a court analyze efforts to make payment. But this Note will
recommend that the most practical course of action is to ignore this prong all
together, because if a debtor has such a dire need for discharge under prong two,
the court will likely not be swayed by the fact that he has not made payments or
enrolled in an alternative payment plan.'
In In re Hornsby, the debtors received several deferments and forbearances but
defaulted before making a single payment.72 Despite the fact that they had not
made a single payment on the student loans, the bankruptcy court decided to
partially discharge the loans, mainly focusing on the debtors' lack of disposable
income under prong one. Although the court focuses on prong one, this opinion
furthers the theory that prong three is not, and should not be, dispositive. The fact
that a debtor can fail to make even a single payment seriously erodes the purpose
behind prong three. The goal is that the person has tried for some time to pay
down the loan. Should a deferment or forbearance be considered an "attempt to
pay" at all? The Sixth Circuit seems to think so, and this is troubling.
II. UNCONTROLLABLE HARDSHIPS

The next two Parts of this Note will focus on bringing to life the argument that
control should be the main focus in student loan discharge cases. The issue of
student loan discharge in bankruptcy is highly fact-driven, so these sections will be
comprised of case analyses. Not surprisingly, most of the cases for which discharge
is allowed involve a serious medical condition. This particular category of cases,
those for which a hardship should result in discharge, should present very little
debate as to whether the debtor deserves to receive the discharge. Their
circumstances are clearly intense, uncontrollable, and unlikely to improve in the
foreseeable future.
First, consider In re Barrett in more detail." In this case, the debtor had over
$94,000 in student loan debt." He earned master's degrees in Health
Administration and Business Administration in 1999, after which he was
diagnosed with the highest level of Hodgkin's disease, a type of cancer.7 1 It was
during his chemotherapy that his student loans became due.7 7 After nine months of
chemotherapy, the debtor was too weak to work and earn any income, so he filed
for Chapter 7 bankruptcy because of his accumulating medical bills. 7 A year after
71 This would save time, money, and simply the process. Of course, some courts are narrowing the
issues on their own, but formally streamlining the process and emphasizing the most important aspect
will allow all parties to understand the process better and will allow debtors to set themselves up for
success in these claims.
n Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hornsby (In re Hornsby), 144 F.3d 433, 435 (6th Cir. 1998).
7 Id. at 438.
74
In re Barrett,487 F.3d 353.
75 Id. at 356.
76 Id. at 356-57.
7
Id. at 357.
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filing, the debtor was diagnosed with avascular necrosis, a condition which causes
bones to die." Because of this condition, the debtor suffered from "massive pain" in
multiple areas of his body and required multiple surgeries." He testified that he
could not "even hold a coffee cup with [his] right hand," and expected to have more
surgeries." Not surprisingly, the debtor testified that he could not find employment
because of his medical conditions.82
The court declared that the debtor satisfied the second prong of the Brunner
Test because his "financial woes are not the result of his own choice of profession,
but rather are due to circumstances beyond his control."' The court also noted that
he satisfied the first prong in that his monthly income totaled $868 and his
monthly expenses were $3,575.' The final result is consistent with an analysis that
takes control of the hardship under the highest consideration. Note that prong
three is likely of no consequence in this case. The debtor did not make: any
payments toward his student loan. Although the court gives him credit for having
received deferments and forbearances, his situation was so hopeless and beyond his
control that the court likely would have taken the same course of action had he
defaulted instead of deferred.
In In re Bagley, the debtor stopped working because of a difficult pregnancy."s
The baby was born with serious respiratory problems and was kept in intensive care
for some time after birth." The debtor and her husband lived near the welfare level,
her husband's income was not expected to increase, and she could not work becaisse
the child required care for which a babysitter could not provide." Additionally, the
court noted that the debtor did not anticipate receiving or inheriting any kind of
wealth in the future." The court did not discuss control, although such a discussion
would have been helpful and revealing since the debtor's circumstances were not
self-imposed and would exist into the foreseeable future. The debtor in this case, as
in many others, had not made a single payment toward her student loans. 9 Again,
this shows that the third prong is an unnecessary burden on the court when the
debtor can prove that the circumstance they sits in is serious enough, out of their
control, and will persist into the foreseeable future.

79

Id.
8 Id.
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Id.
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* Id. at 363.
* Id. at 357-58.
s Conn. Student Loan Found. Inc., v. Bagley (In re Bagley), 4 B.R. 248, 249 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
1980).
8 Id.
8 Id. at 251.
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III. SELF-IMPOSED HARDSHIPS

For the circumstances in this category, it should be clear that the debtor does
not qualify for discharge under the current Brunner Test. The reasons behind
denying discharge for these loans can be justified solely by referencing control over
the hardship; although, courts will use many other justifications for their decision.
Not surprisingly, many of the cases within this category involve a debtor claiming
that they are unable to find a job. Failure to find a well-paying job presents
particularly interesting legal challenges.
From a control standpoint, the inability to find a job should never constitute an
undue hardship, unless there are additional circumstances inhibiting the job hunt,
such as the debilitating physical disabilities that the debtor in Barrett sufferedwhich did not allow him to hold a job that required much more than moving a
computer mouse." Many courts agree with this conclusion." As can be imagined,
allowing discharge for the mere inability to find a job would open the door to a
robust number of claims for student loan discharge that, if allowed, would
contravene the purpose of § 532(a)(8). If courts do not adequately account for
control over the debtor's situation, the door will be opened to discharge student
loans for anyone who loses a job due to a recession, because of commercial changes,
or even in situations where one is fired. Of course, the loss of a job in these
situations is most likely outside of the control of the debtor, but the ability to find a
new job, even if in a different field, may be within the control of the debtor
provided that they are not disabled, elderly, or too unhealthy to work. The loss of a
job under many circumstances does not present a situation of hopelessness-which
is required under prong two.
In re Oyle 2 depicts very well the concept of control over hardships, and also
serves as a clear example of the unimportance of prong one and three of the
Brunner Test. In this case, the debtor held a bachelor's and master's degree, was a
former salesman and engineer, and formerly owned a business, but was only
earning $10,000 per year as the pastor of a Jewish church that he founded.93
Despite the fact that the debtor was making regular $50 payments to his student
loans through his Chapter 13 filing, the debtor satisfied the first prong regarding
ability to pay from a budgeting standpoint-but the court refused to discharge his
90 Barrett v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Barrett), 487 F.3d 353, 357 (6th Cir. 2007).
91 See, e.g., Healey v. Mass. Higher Educ. (In re Healey), 161 B.R. 389, 395 (E.D. Mich. 1993)
("A resolute determination to work in one's field of dreams, no matter how little it pays, cannot be the
fundamental standard from which 'undue hardship' ... is measured."). A debtor must do everything
within their power to improve their financial situation and look for better employment. See Storey v.
Natl Enter. Sys. (In re Storey), 312 B.R. 867, 872-73 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2004). A debtor is required
to explore work in areas outside their expertise or training. See Brightfil v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance
Agency (In re Brightful), 267 F.3d 324, 329 n. 4 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Greco v. Sallie Mae Servicing
Corp. (In re Greco), 251 B.R. 670, 677 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000) ("[d]ebtor has not demonstrated any
efforts to seek employment in another field").
92 Oyler v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Oyler), 397 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2005).
93 Id. at 384.
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student loans because he did not qualify under prong two of the BrunnerTest.94 In
particular, the court discussed the importance of the control that the debtor had
over his circumstance regarding his career choice. 9 s The court stated, "Oyler's
choice to work as a pastor of a small start-up church cannot excuse his failure to
supplement his income so that he can meet knowingly and voluntarily incurred
financial obligations. By education and experience he qualifies for higher-paying
work and is obliged to seek [that] work . . . ."6
The Seventh Circuit posited several additional aspects of a claim for student
loan discharge due to difficulty obtaining a job.97 As a forty-five year old man, this
debtor went back to school for his master's degree in psychology.98 Prior to starting
classes, he was arrested for felony possession of cocaine.99 After being convicted of
the felony charge, the debtor feared that the conviction would render him unable to
complete a 3,000 hour certification program required for his degree; due in paii-to
that fear, the debtor failed to finish his coursework.' 00 During the time he was
taking these classes, however, the debtor incurred $76,000 worth of student loan
debt and never attempted to make a single payment."'o The court refused- to
discharge the debtor's student loans primarily for failing to satisfy the second prong
of the BrunnerTest.'02 In the process, the court made several bold statements that
other courts have failed to make. One of these statements was a recognition that
the debtor "[p]resumably ... has some source of revenue to maintain his claimed
drug dependency," in response to the debtor's claim that his primary reason for
non-payment was that he suffered from substance abuse."o3
The court also shed light upon whether the hardship's inception was before or
after incurring the debt. The court stated, "[b]y his own admission, these
circumstances predated his attendance at UW Stout and his acceptance of the
responsibility of these student loans. By returning to graduate school at the age of
45 and voluntarily assuming the debt, Goulet must have believed that he had future
earnings potential."10 4 Under a control theory, a circumstance which renders a
debtor unlikely to be able to pay a student loan not yet incurred should create a
much stronger presumption against discharge. Such a situation depicts a particular
variety of affairs, the sort for which the exception to student loans was created. If a
debtor, like the one in Goulet, suffers from a hardship before incurring the debt,
which ends up being the very reason for which he does not compete his degree, the
9 Id. at 384, 386.
95

Id. at 386.

9 See Goulet v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 284 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2002).
9 Id. at 776, 779.
9
1Id. at 776.
100 d.
101

Id
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debt almost appears like it was fraudulently incurred.s
Finally, many courts make
statements regarding the debtor being uneducated or unintelligent, but the court in
Goulet brings to light the reality of the situation by stating: "Goulet is an
intelligent man. The record does not reveal that he lacks usable job skills or that he
is hindered by a limited education. In fact, because of the loans, he received an
excellent education."'s
Courts also appear to be resistant toward discharging student loans when a
debtor claims that they cannot pay due to suffering from alcoholism. Alcohol use
disorder is considered a disease,o' yet the courts view this impairment differently.
In particular, these cases use the term "insurmountable" to declare that the debtor
has not satisfied prong two of the Brunner Test."0 s Insurmountability appears to
directly reflect the amount of control that the debtor has in overcoming his
addiction. For example, one court believed that Congress did not contemplate drug
addiction when the Code was written, and did not view the chance of relapse as
enough to warrant discharge.0 9 Courts view most results of the disease (temporal
career restrictions or revocation of driving licenses) as temporary impairments that
the debtor has the power to overcome.11 o Is this sound under a control theory?
There is a strong argument for answering this question in the affirmative.
That is not to say that there may not be a situation in which an alcoholic is so
deeply affected by their addiction that they will not be able to function properly in
society. But consider alcoholism from its inception. The debtor is not forced to
drink during the time that he or she is becoming an alcoholic-this is a decision
that is within their complete control. But even after addiction has ensued, barring
proof that the debtor is in a permanent, debilitative physical state because of the
alcoholism, the debtor has control over their efforts to obtain help, seek treatment,
and hold a job. Overall, the debtor had the choice to begin drinking, and has the
choice to obtain treatment. One court discharged student loans because of
alcoholism in In re Nichols. Unfortunately, the court did not elaborate on the
physical state of the debtor other than to provide that the debtor "will be unable to
function at more than a subsistance [sic] level for a substantial period and perhaps
for the rest of his life.""'
For comparison purposes, it is helpful to include an example of medical
conditions which the court does not, and should not, see as sufficiently debilitating

105

Fraudulently incurred debts are automatically non-dischargeable. 11 U.S.C.

§

523(a)(2)(A)

(2016).
Goulet, 284 F.3d at 779 (emphasis added).
157 See Alcohol-Related Disorders, in AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION: DIAGNOSTIC
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (Am. Psychiatric Ass'n et al. eds., 5th ed.
2013).
" See Roach v. United Student Aid Fund, Inc. (Inre Roach), 288 B.R. 437, 446 (Bankr. E.D. La.
2003); see also Roberson v. Ill. Student Assistance Comm'n (In re Robertson), 999 F.2d 1132, 1137
(7th Cir. 1993).
in See In re Roach, 288 B.R. at 446.
no See, e.g., id.; see also In re Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1137.
n. Nichols v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. (In re Nichols), 15 B.R. 208,'209 (Bankr. D. Me. 1981).
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so as to qualify under prong two of the Brunner Test. One debtor in the Sixth

Circuit claimed that she was unable to work because she had lost her sense of taste
and could not cope. 1 ' In addition to several emotional problems,"' the debtor

claimed to have sustained colorectal surgery-which she attests to be the source of
her loss of taste." 4 The court was not fooled by this and simply concluded that the
debtor's loss of taste did not have an effect on her finding work, and that this could

not stand as an excuse for failing to pay her student loans."s
IV. How AND WHY SHOULD SELF-IMPOSED HARDSHIPS BE NONDISCHARGEABLE?

A. Whyis Controllmportant?
Because self-imposed hardships for which a debtor has complete control serve
such a disservice to the student loan exception from discharge, something must be
done to emphasize the importance of those hardships. It is true that bankruptcy is
remedial in nature. When one files for bankruptcy, the court is essentially
discharging loans for which the debtor has control over incurring, and for which
the debtor may have been irresponsible in incurring. But student loans present a
unique challenge. In some instances, it is necessary to take the debtor's poor
decision-making into account and therefore reposition the remedial nature of
bankruptcy.
Not only is this repositioning currently being done with respect to student
loans, but it has also been done in other areas of the Code. Take for example the

exclusion to discharge in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C)(i)(I) (2016). This provision
states that "consumer debts owed to a single creditor and aggregating more than
$650 for luxury goods or services incurred by an individual debtor on or within 90
days before the order for relief under this title are presumed to be
nondischargeable."n 6 This provision was added to the Code in order to reflect the
"sensible belief that credit card issuers deserve some protection against the excesses
of a 'credit card spree' that allowed debtors to acquire expensive luxuries on the eve
of bankruptcy . . . .""' In the same manner, student loan creditors, and our
government (which backs those loans) deserve strict protection against the abuse of
the bankruptcy and student loan system from debtors attempting to discharge
student loans for which they incurred haphazardly.

Tu Tirch

v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Tirch), 409 F.3d 677, 681-82 (6th Cir.

2005).

13

4

The debtor claimed to have ADD, anxiety, and depression. Id. at 679.

1 Id

"s Id. at 681-82.
116 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C)(i)(I) (2016).
11 7
WILLIAM D. WARREN & STEVEN D. WALT, PAYMENTS AND CREDITS 155 (Robert C. Clark
et al. eds., 9th ed. 2013).
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The bankruptcy system's main method of checking for abuse is through the
"means test.""' The means test is essentially a different kind of income and expense
analysis. As long as the debtor's income is lower than the state median, they will
qualify for a Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing."' Otherwise, they will be required to file
for a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, which accounts for higher income earners and
requires a repayment period before discharge.' 20 Once the debtor qualifies for either
Chapter 7 or Chapter 13, there is no analysis made as to whether the debtor made
good faith efforts to repay or whether they have likely-to-persist circumstances that
hinder their ability to pay, as is done in an undue hardship analysis under the
'

BrunnerTest.' 2

The legislature purposefully decided to treat student loans differently than other
types of consumer debt by excepting them from discharge. 122 The legislature
recognized, though, that simply excepting student loans from discharge might not
be appropriate in all situations. Therefore, a small door was left open to those
debtors for which being required to repay the student loans would impose an undue
hardship. 1 23 Why pay particular attention to the control that the debtor has over his
circumstance? And why reflect that concern in an explicit, meaningful way? Simply
because courts say that it is the most important factor. Luckily for us, this is
common sense. As recognized by Judge Kanne in the Seventh Circuit, this is one
category of debt for which we should place responsibility on the debtor:
Congress' decision to increase the availability of higher education
through student loans does not necessarily equate to a decision to
insure the future success of each student taking advantage of that
opportunity. The government guarantees repayment of the loan
to the private lender so that those who, because of their current
wealth and future earning potential would not be eligible to
receive any financing or only financing at a higher rate of interest,
may nonetheless receive an education.
The government is not twisting the arms of potential
students. The decision of whether or not to borrow for a college
education lies with the individual; absent an expression to the
contrary, the government does not guarantee the student's future
financial success. If the leveraged investment of an education
does not generate the return the borrower anticipated, the

u1 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (2016).
19
' Id. § (b)(6).
w Id.
.

121 See supra Part
12

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
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student, not the taxpayers, must accept the consequences of the
decision to borrow. 12 4

Why allow a debtor discharge from student loan obligations, which has been
expressly disallowed? And why, when they have placed themselves in the situation
for which their inability to pay exists, and when these loans are so easy to obtain?
Particularly because student loans are so easily obtainable, their strict treatment
in bankruptcy should be maintained. As an alternative to always allowing student
loan discharge and forcing lenders and higher educational institutions to drastically
alter their practices, accounting for personal choice in student loan discharge
considerations maintains the system's purpose more easily. If lenders were forced to
analyze more stringently the ability of a borrower to repay because of the risk that
the loans would be effortlessly dischargeable, student loans would not be available
to nearly as many people. Under our current system, nearly all applicants are
approved for financing1 2 5 and they should therefore be held to a higher standard in
repayment. Accounting for control over the hardship places the responsibility
directly onto the borrower to repay the debt-which is a practice that does not
occur with other forms of consumer debt that are more difficult to obtain. If the
United States wants to maintain its "American Dream" status quo and further the
notion that all citizens can earn a college education, making sure that student loans
are extremely difficult to discharge is an irreplaceable necessity. Otherwise, only
students with an apparent ability to repay will be approved.
B. Examples of Cases That Would be Reversedif
Analyed Under a Control Theory
There are many cases that dearly reflect the injustice of failing to recognize the
control that a debtor has over the circumstances which render them unable to pay
their student loans; and under a control theory, these cases would turn out
differently. First, consider In re Hornsby.126 In that case, the debtors, a married
couple with three children, incurred over $30,000 in debt, mostly comprised of'
student loans.' 27 Both studied business and computers for a period of five years and
attended various state colleges. Neither graduated.' 28 The debtors received several
deferments and forbearances. Nonetheless, the debtors defaulted before making

124 Roberson v. Ill. Student Assistance Comm'n (In re Robertson), 999 F.2d 1132, 1136-37 (7th
Cir. 1993).
u5 Who Gets Aid, FED. STUDENT AID: AN OFF. OF THE U.S. DEPT OF EDUC.,
https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/eligibility#basic-criteria (last visited Sept. 23, 2016) ("Most people are
eligible for financial aid for college or career school.") (indicating basic eligibility criteria which notes
nothing indicative of ability to repay and showing that there is no age limit).
12 6
Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hornsby (in re Hornsby), 144 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 1998).
7

12 Id. at 435.
128
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their first payment. 2 9 During the discharge proceedings, the husband was making
$6.53 per hour and working occasional over-time at AT&T, and the wife had just
transferred jobs in order to become the director of a childcare facility, after which
they had a high-end monthly surplus of close to three hundred dollars.130 Although
the Sixth Circuit suggested institution of a partial discharge on remand instead of a
fill discharge,' 3 1 .the debtors had sufficient control over their circumstances such
that discharge should have been disallowed entirely.
This Note does not include a discussion of partial discharge, but what should be
recognized is that the debtors had enough control over their situation to make
discharge contrary to the student loan exception's purpose. First, the bankruptcy
court ignored the sizeable budget surplus available to these debtors.13 2 The debtors
in Homsby had a surplus of two to three hundred dollars each month,3 3 compared
to the deficit of $2,700 in Barrett. More importantly, compare the reason for the
deficit in Barrett to the reason for the surplus in Homsby. In Hornsby, the
bankruptcy court expressed what seems to be a personal opinion that the debtors
had understated their expenses. 13 s Second, the bankruptcy court did not inquire
into or require documentation of the "unexpected expenses" referred to by the
debtor which was an excuse for not paying; and it failed to address the presence of
money spent on excessive telephone and electric use, meals eaten out, and
expenditure on cigarettes, none of which fit into the factors from In re Douglas.'3 6

The Sixth Circuit also noted that the debtors were not unhealthy or aged.' 37
The court recognized too that the debtor's poor "management of their debts do not
meet any test of undue hardship such to justify discharge of their student loan
obligations."' Although the Sixth Circuit's discussion surrounds prong one of the
Brunner Test, the debtors did not have any unbearable circumstances that kept
them from paying. Unlike other courts have concluded, it is clear that the debtors
did not take all steps necessary to minimize their expenses.' 3 ' They had control over
the tightening of their budget and the increasing of their income, neither of which
were hindered by any uncontrollable circumstance such as a serious medical illness.
Another troublesome case is In re Cheesman.' In this case, the dissent
logically analyzes the debtors' ability to repay by concluding:

1d.
Id. at 435-36.
"I Id. at 440..
132 Id. at 438.
133 Id. at 435-36.
Barrett v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Barrett), 487 F.3d 353, 357-58 (6th Cir. 2007).
13s See In re Hornsby, 144 F.3d at 438.
13 Id.; Douglas v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Douglas), 366 B.R. 241, 253 (Bankr. M.D.
Ga. 2007).
13 In re Hornsby, 144 F.3d at 438.
129
130
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The Cheesmans are not disabled. They are not ill. They are not
elderly. They are both college trained. At the time of the
bankruptcy hearing, Mr. Cheesman held a job, and he testified
that there was a possibility of a promotion with his current
employer. Mrs. Cheesman is qualified to tutor or substitute
teach, as she did prior to the filing of the Chapter 7 petition.
These circumstances are inapposite of those in cases in which a
court has found "additional circumstances" to exist.1 41
The dissenting opinion then went on to cite to several situations for which
discharge was appropriate, such as that in In re Diaz, where the hearing-impaired
debtor failed to receive her degree because of illnesses which kept her out of class
for one or two months at a time, could not work for more than a half-day beciise
of physical problems, and had a child with dental problems who was required to
attend a psychiatric clinic.1
The majority in Cheesman ignored the facts cited by the dissent, and, with
specific regard to the debtors' circumstances, the court said that there was no
guarantee that the debtors would get promotions and find jobs as they hoped to.1 43
Because the government does not guarantee a return on investment from a college
education, and definitely does not guarantee future promotions and job prospects,
the government should not have been required to foot this bill. The Cheesmans
had complete control over their ability to earn more money and to put the surplus
in their budget to proper use. It is true that Mr. Cheesman's promotion was not
guaranteed, but testimony from a debtor himself indicating a promotion as a
possibility should be a red flag against discharge. Moreover, the Cheesmans
suffered from no additional circumstances that disallowed them to continue to
work, find new jobs, or be promoted. When the court decided as it did, it
incorrectly emphasized the control the debtor had over how much his current
employer paid him, not on the control the debtor had to find or keep a goodpayingjob. This focus skews the real issue.
Both husband and wife held bachelor's degrees, and with a bachelor's degree in
English and experience teaching, the majority's argument that the wife could not
get a better job than that of a teacher's aide is highly unsatisfactory and entirely too
subjective and speculative." Under a control analysis, the debtors in this case
would not have been deserving of discharge because they were in fill control over
their ability to utilize their budget surplus and keep and find jobs that would have
paid them well. Like in Hornsby, the debtors did not suffer from any conditions

141 Id. at 362 (Guy, J., dissenting).
142 Id. (citing Diaz v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Diaz), 5 B.R. 253, 253-54
(Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1980)).
11 Id. at 360.

1"

See id at 358, 360.
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outside of their control which rendered them unable to find or keep a decent job.
With this decision, the Sixth Circuit made a travesty of justice.
Yet again is a case that completely disregards the fact that the debtor has
control over his tough situation: In re Clay.14 5 This case presents two troublesome
conclusions. First, it ruled that the debtor's voluntary support of his parents
supported his request for student loan discharge.'" The debtor's parents were
retired and unemployed, and the opinion states that the "parents depend upon him
for their livelihood."147 The court makes no mention of affirmative evidence that
the parents are legally dependent on the debtor-and this would seem to be
necessary. A moral obligation to take care of one's parents should not be
justification for failing to meet financial obligations that are non-dischargeable
without proof of hopeless circumstances of the debtor himself.
Second, and more concerning, the court stated that a substantial justification
for discharge was that the debtor's education provided him with little benefit.148 It
has already been stated, and is common sense, that the government does not
guarantee the fruits of one's educational pursuits. Neither do universities. Along
with this argument, the court uses peer pressure to enter into a student loan
agreement as a reason why a debtor is deserving of discharge. This is highly
contrary to the integrity behind the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act and the exception to student loans in the Code. In fact,
the court itself cites to a House Report which justifies the Act on evidence that
financial advisors had been counseling debtors to file for bankruptcy in order to
discharge their student loans."' Like peer pressure or advice to file for bankruptcy
is met with resistance by the drafters, peer pressure for entering into a student loan
in the first place cannot alternatively serve as a justification for discharge. Allowing
pressure from others to enter into student loans to justify failing to meet repayment
obligations is directly contrary to the very reason for instituting the student loan
discharge-the pressure from financial advisors to discharge student loan debt
through bankruptcy.
Not only are the arguments above unsatisfactory, but the debtor in Clay had
recently received a 9% raise. 5 o The court brought attention to the fact that the
debtor's job was not in jeopardy, but decided on its own that his current job was
not good enough. There was no discussion about the debtor's ability to find a
higher paying job with another company and no allegations that he would not be
able to work in other fields. This was purposeful-ignorance as to the debtor's ability
to control the amount of money he made-which was fully intact.

..
sClay v. Westmar Coll. (In re Clay), 12 B.R. 251 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1981).
146 Id. at 254.
147 Id.
141 Id. at 255.
14 Id. at 253.
1so Id. at 254.

A Missing Piece: The Importance of Control Over an Undue
Hardship in a Request to Discharge Student Loans Through Bankruptcy

2o16-207

C. Recommendations for Reflecting Control of the Hardship
There are several ways that self-imposed hardships could and should be taken
into account in a more purposeful manner. First, the legislature could include a
definition of "undue hardship" in the Code for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8),
which would declare that self-imposed hardships for which the debtor has control
do not qualify. Courts repeatedly point out that this definition is non-existent and
suggest that it would be incredibly helpful in order to reflect the legislative intent
behind the exception to discharge. As is apparent from the case analysis in this
Note, the first and third prongs of the BrunnerTest are not nearly as important as
a second. With regard to the third prong, it tends to be ignored. With regard to the
first prong, it should remain and is not in dire need of revision, but should be
considered last. Therefore, a more meaningful and swift modification to cuftent
practices would be to simply incorporate a control-packed definition of "undue
hardship" in the Code.
Not only is control an important part of the analysis, but a lot of courts
expressly refer to control in their analysis. The harm comes from those cases sich
as Hornsby, Cheesman, and Clay that do not make any meaningful discussion of
control over the hardship, leading to an undeserving discharge. The BrunnerTest
does a decent job at laying out a workable analysis. But to wait for the Supreme
Court to take this matter into their own hands and establish it as national
precedent would be burdensome, and, of course, it is not guaranteed. The
legislature can resolve the matter more efficiently, and it can do so in a way that
would apply to all courts immediately. A suggested definition of "undue hardship"
is as follows:
Student loan obligations impose an undue hardship upon a
student loan debtor when:
a.

b.
c.

the debtor's ability to pay has been hindered by a
circumstance for which the debtor has no control over
alleviating,
which is likely to persist into the foreseeable future, and
the payment for which would place the debtor in a monthly
budget deficit.

This suggestion would be subject to modification, but there are several things that
this definition does: (1) it maintains the most important parts of the Brunner
Test-a long-lasting circumstance and budget impossibility-and could preempt
the BrunnerTest (and other tests) as a more uniform approach; (2) in that respect,
it eliminates the third prong good faith effort to repay, which would alleviate the
heavy debates with regard to whether enrolling in alternative repayment plans
constitutes 'repayment' at all, and it respects the fact that this part of the Brunner
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Test has been ignored; and (3) most obviously, it expressly mentions "control."
Alternately, the courts could adopt a modified, more streamlined testalthough this might require intervention by the Supreme Court. As mentioned
above, the inclusion of most parts of the BrunnerTest are not specifically harmful.
What is most important is that lack ofcontrolof the hardship must be required. A
more efficient test would also dispose of the third prong, which has been
demonstrated to be of little clout with the courts. Then, only if a controlled
circumstances test is passed would the court analyze ability to pay. This course of
action, versus legislative intervention, could do what the legislature might not be
able to do with a simple definition-remove the parts of the Brunner Test that
waste time and distort the imperative pieces of the student loan discharge analysis.
An important issue requiring brief attention is the timing of the circumstance.
There is something unique about a situation in which a debtor has an existing
circumstance priorto incurring student loan debt versus a circumstance that arises
after the debt has already been incurred. This shifts the control analysis. In the first
situation, there needs to be a discussion of control over incurringdebt, which one
suspects will be diffilcult or impossible to pay, rather than in the latter situation,
which involves control over the circumstances which make repayment diicult.15 1
The Roach court stated succinctly that an "additional circumstance" is one which
was "either not present when the debtors applied for the loans or has since been
exacerbated. Otherwise, the debtor could have calculated that factor into its costbenefit analysis at the time the debtor obtained the loan."152 For obvious reasons, a
circumstance that existed before incurring the debt should presumptively fail the
undue hardship test. The burden should be on the debtor to prove that it did not
exist before the incurring of the debt, or that it had since exacerbated. Because this
involves control, control of the debtor to incur a debt for which he suspects he
cannot pay, it is of importance in this Note. Additionally, it falls dangerously dose
to fraudulent incurrence of a debt, debts of which are non-dischargeable. Any
modification to current student loan discharge practices should note the
importance of timing of the circumstance.

In Goulet, remember that as reason for nonpayment, the debtor cited to his criminal record as
justification for why he could not complete his degree and get a good job in his field of study. This
criminal record was incurred prior to enrolling in the program. Luckily, the court took that into account
when deciding not to discharge his loans, but this can be hard to catch. Goulet v. Educ. Credit Mgmt.
Corp., 284 F.3d 773, 778-79 (7th Cir. 2002). Note also that this situation probably encompasses a
situation for which a debtor purports that inability to repay has resulted from their enrolling in a useless
degree program which has little to no job prospect attached to it. This is something that the debtor
knows or should know beforehand.
152 Roach v. United Student Aid Fund (In re Roach), 288 B.R. 437, 445 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2003)
(quoting Thoms v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Thoms), 257 B.R. 144, 149 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y.
2001)).
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CONCLUSION

The Bankruptcy Code and courts across the country need clarification of the
meaning of undue hardship. Control of the hardship must be reflected in this
clarification. Student loans can be incurred by virtually anyone, without regard to
their ability to repay. Because neither the government nor the lenders have
purported to guarantee any value from the voluntary pursuit of a post-secondary
degree, the bankruptcy implications of student loans are different than the
implications for other types of financial obligations. This requires a repositioning of
the remedial nature of bankruptcy proceedings with regard to student loans. This
repositioning of the remedial nature of bankruptcy simply requires that the debtors
bear some responsibility for incurring these large, unsecured student loans. It is
appropriate to place that burden on the debtor. Otherwise, a post-secondary
education cannot sustainably be offered to the majority of applicants. Some courts
discuss on their own the importance of control. But explicitly requiring a lack of
control over the hardship would change the result in many cases, would better
maintain the integrity of the exception, and would make the legal analysis clearer to
all parties involved in the process, including the debtor themselves.
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